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ABSTRACT 
 
Recently Patent Pooling has a fast growing interest as a good alternative means to decrease 
transaction costs between IPRs owners and promote technology commercialization and diffusion. 
In this paper we attempt to shed light on the effects of patent pooling on the ex-ante innovation 
investment or incentive using the game theoretical economic model. We generalize the model by 
including many vertical integrated firms, research laboratories, and specialized manufacturing 
firms. Main results of this paper are: 1) Patent Pools can affect on the innovation incentives of 
vertically integrated firms(I-firms) and of research laboratories(R-firms) differently, and the effect 
depends on the number of I-firms owning essential  patents and the number of specially 
manufacturing firms(M-firms). But in the presence of many I-firms owning essential patents, the 
instruction of patent pooling increases  I-firms’ ex-ante innovation incentive or investments with 
independence of M-firms. 2) There is strategic complementary relationship between innovation 
investments of I-firms and those of R-firms, so I-firms’ increased ex-ante innovation investments 
make R-firms’ ex-ante innovation investments increasing. 3) In the case of R-firms maximizing 
private profit, the best aspect is to license independently their patent technology when I-firms 
make up patent pools. But this aspect is not desirable for I-firms because I-firms’ gross profit is 
smaller than that of I-firms which license their patent technologies independently. However, we 
show that in the cases of many I-firms owning essential patent technologies, patent pools 
including only I-firms(IP) or all upstream firms(CP) can affect asymmetrically on the I-firms’ or 
R-firms’ innovation investments. Nonetheless, any types of patent pools make the innovation 
investments of I-firms and R-firms higher than those of all firms which license independently. In 
summary, nowadays under general aspects that production of final goods requires many complex 
technologies and that many I-firms and R-firms attend R&D for essential technologies, 
competition authorities’ deregulation for patent pooling or government policy supporting the 
patent pooling can promote upstream firms’ innovation incentives or investments and compulsory 
licensing about R-firms is not necessary for enhancing upstream firms’ innovation investments or 
incentives.. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
owadays, the interests on patent pools has a fast growing interest as a good alternative means to 
decrease transaction costs between IPRs owners and promote technology commercialization and 
diffusion. Patent pools have a very long history and Sewing machine pool at 1856 is known as the 
first patent pool(Gilbert, 2004). Recently U.S DoJ(Department of Justice) considers that the patent pools can have 
pro-competitive effects. In fact, U.S DoJ had affirmed MPEG, 3G, and DVD patent pools as pro-competitive.  
 
Most Existent researches about patent pools mainly have been accomplished by lawyers or law school 
professors, but recently some economists published research papers on the patent pools. Shapiro(2001) analyzes the 
effects of paten pools on the downstream market using single-period static model and insists that patent pools can 
N 
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remove the complement problem under some strong assumptions. Kim(2004) expands the research of Shapiro(2001) 
by more realistic assumptions, that is, he includes the vertically-integrated firms in analyzing the effects of patent 
pools and assumes that downstream market is Cournot competition. The main results of Kim(2004) are that patent 
pools including the vertically integrated firms can remove complement problem and decrease double 
marginalization problem and rival’s cost raising effects. On the other hand, Lerner & Tirole(2004) developed a more 
tractable model with more alleviated assumptions such as imperfect complementarity of patents. They provide a 
necessary and sufficient condition for welfare-enhancing patent pools, and show that requiring patent pool members 
to have independent licensing is a screening mechanism for welfare-decreasing patent pools. Using the framework 
of Lerner & Tirole(2004), Brenner(2005) provides a optimal pool formation mechanism which prevents welfare-
decreasing pooling equilibrium from emerging but encourages welfare-enhancing pool formation. Brenner(2004) 
also shows that mandatory individual licensing is not an efficient screening mechanism for welfare-decreasing pools. 
 
Choi(2003) analyzes the incentives to form patent pools or to engage in cross-licensing arrangements in the 
presence of uncertainty as to the validity and the coverage of patents. Aoki and Nagaoka(2005) show that a complete 
patent pool can be implemented only if the number of patent holders is small, and that emergence of an outsider is 
inevitable for large number of patent holders. Moreover, they also show that specialized research firms are more 
likely to become an outsider. Kato(2004) investigates a patent pool of substitute patents and show that a pool of 
substitute patents may promote the competition of downstream market under certain conditions and thereby enhance 
social welfare. Lerner et al.(2005) show empirically that the patent pools consisted of complementary patents are 
more likely to permit independent licensing of member.   
 
However, existent literatures do not provide more detail analyses about effects of patent pools on 
innovators’ innovation investment. Dequiedt & Versaevel(2004) focus on this issues and analyze the impacts of 
possible pool formation on the ex-ante incentives to innovate. They show that a firm’s investment pattern is upward 
sloping over time before pool formation but decrease dramatically after pool formation. Therefore, they insist that 
recently a general pool formation mechanism based on a proposal by the industry and acceptance/refusal by the 
competition authority may induce overinvestment in early innovations and lead to a delayed clearance date. 
However, Dequiedt & Versaevel(2004) do not provide the asymmetric effects of possible patent pools on ex-ante 
innovation investments or incentives of different kind upstream firms  and do not consider the strategic behavior of 
upstream firms. Therefore, in this paper we analyze this issues more detail based on strategic perspectives using a 
game theoretical economic model. 
 
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present our theoretical model. In the section 3, we 
derive market equilibriums for different kind of upstream firms. Then we show more details about the effects of 
patent pooling on ex-ante innovation investments or incentives of upstream firms. Finally this paper concludes with 
final remarks.   
 
2.  MODEL 
 
In this paper, we use a generalized 3-stage game theoretical model and analyze the effects of patent pooling 
on the ex-ante innovation investments or incentives of upstream firms. Before detail analyses, we summarize main 
assumptions about technology and firms. We assume that each technology owned by all upstream firms is 
complementary and essential to produce final goods.  That is, each downstream firm has to use one unit of each 
technology owned by all upstream firms to produce final goods. We also assume that there are no vertical 
restrictions in the package licensing through patent pools and per-unit royalty rates of all upstream firms is non-
discriminatory.  
 
On the other hand, there are three kinds of firms for generalization of analysis. That is, we assume that 
there are k vertically integrated firms attending both upstream and downstream market, and research laboratories 
attending only upstream market for example universities or government-funded research institutes. But we assume 
that there is only one research laboratory for the convenience without loss of generality. Finally, we assume that 
there are n specialized manufacturing firms attending only final goods production and that the uncertainty at 
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upstream and downstream market does not exist in. We also assume that all kinds of firms and consumers have 
complete information and final goods are homogeneous 
 
Firms engage in R&D, technology trade, and production. There are 1k   element technologies, each of 
which is essential in the production of the final goods. Of the 1k   firms, k  firms engage in both R&D and 
production, so these are called vertically integrated firms, which will be called as I-firms. The remaining one firm 
engages in only R&D and technology transfer and we will call it the R-firm. For example, we can regard research 
labs, universities, or government-funded research institutes as the example of R-firm. We also assume that there are 
n  specialized manufacturing firms, which will be called as M-firms, attending downstream market for producing 
final goods.  
 
The order of play is as follows. In the first stage, all upstream firms(I-firms and R-firm) compete to develop 
each element technology and the innovation investments of each upstream firms are represented by 
  1,  ,  ,  ix i k R .  In this stage, each upstream firm chooses R&D investment level to maximize its expected 
value function. In the second stage, each upstream firm decides to license independently its own technology at a per-
unit royalty rate or collectively through patent pools at a pool royalty rate. Finally, in the third stage, I-firms produce 
final goods at zero cost save for license costs and engage in quantity competition(i.e. Cournot competition) in the 
product market independently and simultaneously. The products are assumed to be homogeneous and the inverse 
demand function is given by    P a bQ  , where Q  denotes the total industry output.  
 
While each firm’s profit functions are as follows. I-firms’ gross profits are given by 
 i i i i iP c q l Q                                           1, ,i k  (2.1) 
 
And R-firm’s gross profit is given by 
R Rl Q    (2.2) 
 
And M-firms’ gross profits is given by 
 Lj j djP c q                                  1, ,j n  (2.3) 
where ic  and  jc  mean the marginal costs of vertically integrated firms and specialized manufacturing firms 
respectively. For the convenience of analysis, we will simplify our model by assuming that all downstream firms, I-
firms and M-firms, produce final goods using the same production technologies and the each firm’s marginal cost is 
the per-unit royalties for licensing in element technologies, that is, marginal production costs for all downstream 
firms are zero. We also assume that marginal costs ic  and jc are low enough. Under these assumptions, marginal 
cost ic of I-firm i  is equal to 
k
R i
j i
l l

 and marginal cost jc  of M-firms is 
1
k
R i
i
l l

 , where Rl means the per-
unit royalty rate of R-firm and il the per-unit royalty rate of I-firm  ( 1, , )i i k . 
 
3.  PRODUCTION AND LICENSING 
 
The game can be solved by backward induction. The equilibrium gross profits, royalty rates, production 
quantities of final goods, industry output, and price of final goods are dependent on whether upstream firms license 
independently their technologies or collectively through patent pools at technology transfer stage(2
nd
 stage). Because 
R-firm that creates profits from royalty revenues can have incentive for independent licensing even in the case of 
patent pooling including all I-firms, we obtain the equilibrium gross profits for three cases and then analyze the 
innovation investment of upstream firms at innovation stage (i.e., 1
st
 stage).  
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3.1.  Independent Licensing 
 
First of all, let us analyze the final goods production stage(3
rd
 stage). In the independent licensing case, 
only I-firms produce final goods because there is asymmetry in the cost structure between I-firms and M-firms. That 
is, M-firms can attend in the final goods production market by paying royalties to all upstream firms, but I-firms 
don’t have to pay royalty for their own patent technology. I-firm  ( 1, , )i i k   sets quantity iq  to maximize its 
expected gross profit
i  given by (2.1). Solving for the first-order conditions; 
 
  ( )    0
k
i
R j i
j ii
a bQ l l bq
q


 
      
  
    ( 1, , )i k  (3.1) 
 
From above FOCs for profit maximization, we can obtain the equilibrium industry gross output as follow. 
 
( ) ( 1)
( 1)
IN Rk a l k LQ
k b
  


 (3.2) 
 
where
1
k
j
j
L l

 . And the equilibrium final goods production quantity of I-firm  ( 1, , )i i k is given by  
 
( ) 2 ( 1)
( 1)
IN R i i
i
a l L k l
q
k b
   

 ( 1, , )i k  (3.3)  
where
k
i j
j i
L l

 . Therefore, we can obtain I-firm i ’s ( 1, , )i k and R-firm’s equilibrium profits from 
equation (2.1) and (2.2) as follow 
 
 ( )IN IN IN INi R i i i ia bQ l L q l Q        (2.1)’ 
  
( ) ( 1)
( 1)
IN IN R
R R R
k a l k L
l Q l
k b

   
     
 
 (2.2)’ 
  
Now let us go back one step to the technology transfer stage.  In this stage, all upstream firms which have 
each essential technology maximize their own gross profits by imposing optimal royalty rates independently.  
 
First, we analyze the case where each firm individually sets its own royalty rates ic  freely to maximize its 
own expected gross profit. From ( 1, , )INi i k   and 
IN
R , the first-order conditions for I-firm  ( 1, , )i i k  
and for R-firms reduce to  
 
 
 ( ) 0
IN
IN IN INi
R i i i i
i i
a bQ l L q l Q
l l

 
 
        
 (3.4) 
0
IN
INR
R
R R
l Q
l l
 
     
 (3.5) 
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From equation (3.4) and (3.5), we can obtain the optimal equilibrium royalty rates for each firm as follow 
2
3
       ( 1, , )
6 1
IN
i
k
l a i k
k k

 
 
 (3.6) 
2
2( 1)
  
6 1
IN
R
k
l a
k k


 
 (3.7) 
 
Therefore, substituting (3.6) and (3.7) in (3.2), (3.3), (2.1)’, and (2.2)’, the maximized equilibrium gross 
profit for I-firms and R-firm are given by  
 
2 2
2 2
2( 2 1)
       ( 1, , )
( 6 1)
IN
i
a k k
i k
b k k

   
  
  
 (3.8) 
2
2 2
4 ( 1)
 
( 6 1)
IN
R
a k k
b k k

  
  
  
 (3.9) 
 
3.2.  Patent Pooling Among I-firms(IP) 
 
Second, let us analyze the case that all I-firms agree with attending a patent pool but R-firm dose not attend 
the patent pool. In the convenience, let us call this type of patent pool as Incomplete patent pool(IP). Of course, we 
can consider other cases that some I-firms attend a patent pool, but we will not consider these cases. We also assume 
that the patent pool set collectively a per-unit royalty rate IPl  and that each member I-firm shares the royalty rate 
and the royalty share of I-firm  ( 1, , )i i k  is
1
 1
k
i i
i
 

 
 
 
 .  Therefore, gross profit functions of I-firm 
 ( 1, , )i i k , R-firm, and M-firms  ( 1, , )j j n  are given by  
 
 ( )   i R IP i i IPP l l q l Q         1, ,i k  (3.10) 
R Rl Q    (3.11) 
 ( )  Lj R IP djP l l q        1, ,j n  (3.12) 
 
 
I-firms and M-firms produce final goods at production stage(3
rd
 stage). The FOCs for profit maximization 
of I-firm  ( 1, , )i i k  and M-firm  ( 1, , )j j n  are given by 
 
   ( )   +  0i R IP i i IP
i
a bQ l l bq l
q



     

  1, ,i k  (3.12) 
   ( )    0Lj R IP dj
dj
a bQ l l bq
q

     

  1, ,j n  (3.13) 
 
From above FOCs for profit maximization, we can obtain the equilibrium industry gross output, quantity of 
I-firm  ( 1, , )i i k  and M-firm  ( 1, , )j j n  as follow. 
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 
( ) ( ) ( 1)
,  
( 1)
IP R IP
R IP
k n a k n l k n l
Q l l
k n b
     

 
 (3.14) 
 ( ) ( 1) 2
( , )
( 1)
R i IPIP
i R IP
a l k n l
q l l
k n b
    

 
  1, ,i k  (3.15) 
( ) 2
( , )
( 1)
IP R IP
dj R IP
a l l
q l l
k n b
 

 
  1, ,j n  (3.16) 
 
Therefore, we can obtain I-firm i ’s, R-firm’s, and M-firm j ’s equilibrium profits from equation (3.10), 
(3.11), and (3.12) as follow 
 
 ( 1) 22
( 1) ( 1)
( )( ) ( 1)
         +  
( 1)
R i IPIP R IP
i
R IP
i IP
a l k n la l l
k n k n b
k n a l k n l
l
k n b



       
    
      
     
 
  
  1, ,i k  (3.10)’ 
( )( ) ( 1)
( 1)
IP IP R IP
R R R
k n a l k n l
l Q l
k n b

     
     
  
 (3.11)’ 
 
2
2
2
( 1)
R IPIP
Lj
a l l
k n b

 

 
  1, ,j n  (3.12)’ 
  
In the technology transfer stage(2
nd
 stage), R-firm independently maximize its own gross profits(
IP
R ) but 
all I-firms maximize the pooled profit that means the summation of all I-firms’ gross profits
1
k
IP
i
i


 
 
 
 . From this 
optimization, the optimal equilibrium royalty rates are given by  
 
1
 ,       
3( ) 1 3( ) 1
IP R
k n k n
l a l a
k n k n
  
 
   
 (3.17) 
 
Therefore, substituting (3.17) in (3.10)’, (3.11)’ and (3.12)’, the maximized equilibrium gross profits for I-
firms and R-firm are given by  
 
2 2( )
 
3( ) 1
IP
i i
a k n
b k n
 
   
    
    
  1, ,i k  (3.18) 
2 ( )( 1)
3( ) 1
IP
R
a k n k n
b k n

     
    
   
 (3.19) 
0IPLj    1, ,j n  (3.20) 
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3.3.  Patent Pooling Among All Upstream Firms(CP) 
 
Finally, let us analyze the case that all I-firms and R-firms agree with attending a patent pool. We call this 
type patent pool as complete patent pool(CP). In this case, all upstream firms(I-firms and R-firm) set a per-unit 
royalty rate of the pool, CPl , and each firm share the royalty rate. We assume that the royalty shares of R-firm and I-
firm i   individually is R  and i . Then sum of all upstream firms’ share has to be equal to 1, i.e. 
1
1
k
R i
i
 

  . 
Therefore, Gross profits of I-firm  ( 1, , )i i k , R-firm, and M-firms  ( 1, , )j j n  is given by  
 
    i CP i i CPP l q l Q        1, ,i k  (3.21) 
R R CPl Q    (3.22) 
   Lj CP djP l q       1, ,j n  (3.23) 
 
We can obtain the optimal royalty rate of the pool and the equilibrium gross profits for I-firms, R-firm, and 
M-firms by the same process with the previous section. We summarize the results as follow 
 
2
( 1)( ) ( 1)( ) 2 ( )
   
2 ( 1)( ) ( 1)( ) 2 ( )
i i
CP
i i
k n k n n k ka
l
k n k n n k k
 
 
        
    
          
 
 
 (3.24) 
 ( 1) (1 )(1 )
( 1) ( 1)
( ) ( )
         +             ( 1, , )
( 1)
i i CPi CPCP
i
i CP
i CP
a k n la l
k n k n b
k n a k n l
l i k
k n b
 



       
    
       
    
 
  


 (3.25) 
( ) ( )
( 1)
i CPIP
R R CP
k n a k n l
l
k n b

 
    
  
  

 (3.26) 
2
2
(1 )
( 1)
i CPCP
Lj
a l
k n b


   
 

         1, ,j n  (3.27) 
 
 
3.4.  Comparison Of Upstream Firms’ Equilibrium Gross Profits  
 
To analyze the innovation investments of I-firms and R-firm attending innovation stage, we have to obtain 
the expected value function for upstream firms at that stage. Therefore, it is necessary to compare the gross profits of 
upstream firms that depend on the licensing mechanism at technology transfer stage(2
nd
 stage). For the patent pool 
cases, we assume that royalty share among upstream firms attending the patent pool is allocated based on the pro-
rata rule. In reality, many patent pools introduce this rule for royalty allocation. Under this assumption, we can 
summarize the gross profits of I-firms and R-firm according to independent licensing, incomplete patent pool, and 
complete patent pool as follow. Here we do not give the proof of following propositions because we can easily 
understand the results by simple comparison. 
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Proposition 1. 
 
Given that all the component technologies have been successfully developed, the equilibrium gross profits 
of I-firms according to the licensing strategies satisfy the following: 
 
(1) In the case of small number of licensors, I-firms (2 7)k  , CP IN IPi i i     
(2) In the case of large number of licensors, I-firms ( 8)k  , CP IP INi i i     
 
For vertically-integrated I-firms, we can see that the complete patent pooling in the technology transfer 
stage is the most desirable licensing mechanism with independence of I-firms’ number. Moreover, we also can see 
that the results of proposition 1 do not change according to the number of M-firms.  
 
Proposition 2. 
 
Given that all the component technologies have been successfully developed, the equilibrium gross profits 
of R-firms according to the licensing strategies satisfy the following: 
 
(1) In the case of 2k  , IP IN CPR R R     for the enough large n  
(2) In the case of  3k  , IP IN CPR R R     for 0 7n  , and 
IP CP IN
R R R     for 8n   
(3) In the case of  4k  , IP IN CPR R R     for 0n  , and 
IP CP IN
R R R     for 1n   
(4) In the case of 5k  , IP CP INR R R     for any number of M-firms( 0n  ) 
 
For research laboratory R-firm, we can see that the incomplete patent pool with all I-firms but R-firm is the 
most desirable aspect with independence of the number of I-firms and M-firms.  
 
4.  INNOVATION INVESTMENT 
 
Now let us analyze the innovation staege(1
st
 stage). To analyze ex-ante innovation investments or 
incentives of upstream firms, we use well-developed patent race model(Reinganum 1983, 1986). In general, patent 
race models assume that firms compete for developing a same innovation. Therefore, patent race models may not be 
suitable to our model because we assume that all upstream firms invest their R&D resources to a different but 
complementary element technology. But according to the empirical study on the Racing to invest in pharmaceutical 
R&D by Cockburn and Henderson(1994),  the patent race model is more suitable to a race related to the multiple 
prize and a continual complementarities between innovations developed by competing firms. Therefore, stochastic 
patent race model can be appropriate to analyze the ex-ante innovation investments for our multiple element 
technology development, so we can use the patent race model to analyze the effects of patent pools on the ex-ante 
innovation investments or incentives. 
 
In the innovation investment stage, all upstream firms, I-firms and R-firm, want to maximize their expected 
value function. The discounted present value function of expected value for any upstream firm  ( 1, , , )i i k R  at 
the first stage, is given by  
 
 1( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
0
( , , , ) ( ) ( ) ( )  k R
h x h x h x ti rt i
k R i k RV x x x e e x h x h x h x dt
r
           
  
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1
1
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
i
i k R
k R
x h x h x h x
r
r h x h x h x

 

  
         ( 1, , , )i k R  (4.1) 
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An upstream firm i ’s R&D success probability by time t  is represented by 
( ) 
( ) 1 i
h x t
F t e
  , where 
( )ih x  is hazard rate function and satisfies 
( )
( )
1 ( )
i
f t
h x
F t


 and 
( )
( )
dF t
f t
dt
 . 
 
The objective of all upstream firms is choosing the innovation investment level ix  maximizing their 
expected value function (4.1). Before detailed analysis, we assume that hazard rate function ( )h x satisfies 
'( ) 0,  ''( ) 0h h    . Maximization problem of I-firm i ’s expected value function is given by 
1max   ( , , , )
i
i
k R
x
V x x x  and the FOC is given by solving 0
i
i
i
i
V
V
x


  . Thus we can obtain the FOC as 
follow (See Appendix) 
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                             ( ) ( ) ( ) '( ) 0
i
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
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 
      
 
 
     
 
 (4.2) 
 
While we can confirm that the SOC
2
2
0
ii
i i
ii
i i
VV
V
x x

 
 
   
 
 for the maximization problem is satisfied 
(See Appendix). Moreover, we can obtain the sign of 
2
 
ii
i i
ij
i j j
VV
V
x x x

  
    1, 1, 1, ,j i i k R   is 
positive from FOC (4.2) (See Appendix). Thus we can easily understand that the above results can be generalized as 
follow 
 
 0,  0  1, , , ;  1, , 1, 1, ,i iii ijV V i k R j i i k R       (4.3) 
 
Therefore, we can suggest following proposition. 
 
Proposition 3. 
 
The innovation investment between I-firms and R-firm is strategic complement. 
 
Proof) The total derivative of eq’n (4.2) about 1, , , ,
i
k R ix x x K
r
 
 
 
is given by 
 
1 1 0i
i i i i i i
i i ii i ik k iR R iK idV V dx V dx V dx V dx V dK        (4.4) 
 
From implicit function theorem, the best response curve of I-firms about R-firm or R-firm about any I-
firms is positive slope. That is, 
( )
0
I
I
I
I R IR
I
R IIK
r
dx x V
dx V

    and 
( )
0
R
R
R
R I IR
R
I RRK
r
dx x V
dx V

    are  satisfied from 
SOC and (4.3), where I and R  indicate any I-firms and R-firm respectively.    Q.E.D. 
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Now let us investigate the Nash equilibrium of innovation investment for I-firms and R-firm. Here our 
main interest is the interaction of R&D investment between I-firms and R-firm. From above proposition3, the 
innovation investments between I-firms and R-firm are strategic complement. This means that the increase in I-
firms’ innovation investment gives rise to the increase in R-firm’s innovation investment. Therefore, the Nash 
equilibrium is the intersection of I-firms’ best response curve and I-firm’s best response curve. Here let us assume 
that 
I I
II IRV V and 
R R
RR IRV V are satisfied because of the stability of the equilibrium.  
 
Finally, we can see the effects of patent pools on the ex-ante innovation investments of the upstream firms, 
I-firms and R-firms, by the shift of each firm’s best response curve from the changes in their gross profits. For this 
purpose, we have to investigate the sign of 
R
I
I x
dx
dK
and  
I
R
R x
dx
dK
for any I-firms. From simple calculus, we can see 
that the sign of 
I
I
I
IK
I I
V
V
K x
 
 
 
  
 
is positive for any I-firms, and the sign of 
R
R
R
RK
R R
V
V
K x
 
 
 
  
 
is positive 
(See appendix). Therefore, 
R
I
I x
dx
dK
and 
I
R
R x
dx
dK
have positive sign by implicit function theorem from eq’n (4.4). 
Thus this means that the increase of any upstream firms’ gross profits enhances their ex-ante innovation 
investments..  
 
From the above propositions and the positive effects of gross profits on the ex-ante innovation investments, 
we can suggest following proposition.  
 
Proposition 4. 
 
The equilibrium ex-ante innovation investment of upstream firms according to different licensing strategies 
satisfies the following: 
 
(1) In the case of 2k  , IP IN CPR R Rx x x  and 
CP IN IP
I I Ix x x   for the enough large n  
(2) In the case of  3k  , IP IN CPR R Rx x x  and
CP IN IP
I I Ix x x   for 0 7n  , and 
IP CP IN
R R Rx x x  and
CP IN IP
I I Ix x x   for 8n   
(3) In the case of  4k  , IP IN CPR R Rx x x   and
CP IN IP
I I Ix x x   for  0n  , and 
IP CP IN
R R Rx x x   and 
CP IN IP
I I Ix x x   for 1n   
(4) In the case of 5 7k  , IP CP INR R Rx x x   and 
CP IN IP
I I Ix x x  for any number of M-firms( 0n  ) 
(5) In the case of 8k  , IP CP INR R Rx x x   and 
CP IP IN
I I Ix x x  for any number of M-firms( 0n  ) 
 
From proposition4, we can see that  in the cases of many I-firms owning essential patent technologies, 
patent pools including only I-firms or all upstream firms can affect asymmetrically on the I-firms’ or R-firms’ 
innovation investments. Nonetheless, any types of patent pools make the innovation investments of I-firms and R-
firms higher than those of all firms licensing independently. Therefore, it is very important findings of our research 
that patent pooling promotes the ex-ante innovation investments of any kind of upstream firms and thus the 
technologies essential to produce final goods can be developed more fast under possible patent pooling. These 
results have very important implications to antitrust or competition policy.  
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5.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Recently Patent Pools have a fast growing interest as a good alternative means to decrease transaction costs 
between IPRs owners and promote technology commercialization and diffusion. We attempt to shed light on the 
effects of possible patent pools on the upstream firms’ innovation incentives or investments. Under ex-ante 
perspectives, we show that patent pools can asymmetrically affect on the innovation incentive of vertically 
integrated firms(I-firms) and of research laboratories(R-firms) differently, and the effects depend on the number of 
I-firms owning essential patents and the number of specially manufacturing firms(M-firms). But in the presence of 
many I-firms owning essential patents, instruction of patent pooling can increase I-firms’ ex-ante innovation 
incentive or investments with independence of M-firms. We also show that there is strategic complementary 
relationship between innovation investments of I-firms and those of R-firms, so I-firms’ increased ex-ante 
innovation investments make R-firms’ ex-ante innovation investments increasing. Moreover, in the case of R-firms 
maximizing private profit, the best aspect is to license independently their patent technology when I-firms make up 
patent pools. But this aspect is not desirable for I-firms because I-firms’ gross profit is smaller than that of I-firms 
which are licensing their patent technologies independently. However, we show that in the cases of many I-firms 
owning essential patent technologies, patent pools including only I-firms(IP) or all upstream firms(CP) can affect 
asymmetrically on the I-firms’ or R-firms’ innovation investments. Nonetheless, any types of patent pools make the 
innovation investments of I-firms and R-firms higher than those of all firms which are licensing independently. In 
summary, nowadays under general aspects that production of final goods requires many complex technologies and 
that many I-firms and R-firms attend R&D for essential technologies, competition authorities’ deregulation for 
patent pooling or government policy supporting the patent pooling can promote upstream firms’ innovation 
incentives or investments and compulsory licensing about R-firms is not necessary for enhancing upstream firms’ 
innovation investments or incentives. Our research is based on the ex-ante perspectives, so the empirical analysis 
about the effects of patent pooling still remains an important future work.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Proof of FOCs (4.2) 
 
From (4.1), let us differentiate the expected value of firm i  with respect to ix .  
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h x h x h x h x
rV
V
x
x h x h x h x h x
r


  
    
      
    
     
  
 
where   indicates  1( ) ( ) ( )k Rr h x h x h x     and has positive sign under non-zero discounted rate, 
therefore FOC is given by (4.2).  Q.E.D.  
 
Proof of satisfying SOC for the expected value maximization problem 
 
We can check whether SOC is satisfied by differentiation of FOC. That is, 
i
iiV  is the differentiation of firm i ’s FOC 
with respect to ix .  
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From rearranging the latter part and using FOC (4.2), we can simplify above formula, that is, 
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By rearranging, above formula can be finally reduced as follow 
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 has positive sign and ''( )ih x has 
negative sign by assumption about hazard rate function. Therefore,  
2
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i
V
V
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 has negative sign and this means 
that SOC for any firm ( 1, , , )i i k R  is satisfied. Q.E.D.  
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Proof of satisfying 
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We can check similar process with the proof of satisfying SOC.  That is, 
i
ijV  is the differentiation of firm 
i ’s FOC with respect to jx .  
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From rearranging above formula and using FOC (4.2), we can simplify above formula as follow 
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where we can easily understand that the former formula has positive sign. While the latter formula has positive 
sign because '( )ih x , '( )jh x , 1( ) ( ) ( )
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 has positive sign from FOC. Q.E.D. 
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Proof of satisfying 0 
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Here 
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From rearranging above formula, we can simplify as follow 
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Therefore we can easily understand that the above formula has positive sign. Q.E.D. 
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NOTES 
